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 
Abstract 
Ten insights into the nature of power and its relationship with law 
are derived from the work of Michel Foucault: (1) power is not a 
bad thing; (2) power cannot be abolished; (3) power is not 
monopolised by the powerful; (4) power is everywhere; (5) power 
always provokes resistance; (6) power shapes knowledge; (7) power 
determines truth; (8) law is a strategy of power; (9) law is only one 
of the many strategies of power; and (10) power and discourse are 
non-subjective.  
The following is an expanded version of my welcome address at the 
Transnational, International and Comparative Law and Policy 
Network Interdisciplinary Conference, ‘The Law and Politics of 
Control and Power’, delivered on 26 May 2017 at Bond University, 
Australia. 
I  Introduction 
The theme of this conference is ‘The Law and Politics of Control and 
Power’. I would like to offer some reflections upon this theme, drawing 
upon the work of the philosopher Michel Foucault. I will begin by saying 
that I do not believe these reflections will be particularly original or novel. 
I do, however, believe they will be directly relevant to the theme of this 
conference. And for those for whom the work of Foucault is unfamiliar, 
they may be, as Foucault’s ideas were for me, transformative. 
My understanding of Foucault’s ideas about law and power arises from 
my use of the work of Foucault as the theoretical framework for my 
doctoral thesis. My thesis began as an attempt to understand what it means 
to think critically about law, and how the ability to think critically about 
law can be taught to law students. I discovered within the literature about 
the nature of law and legal education numerous competing descriptions of 
legal critique and its relevance to legal education. This in turn lead to the 
realisation that legal education is not a singular, monolithic enterprise with 
all participants sharing a consistent understanding of the nature of law and 
legal education and the role of critique. Rather, legal education is made up 
of multiple divergent and competing ideologies, or discourses, each 
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 characterised by its own descriptions of the nature of law, the purpose of 
legal education and the role of critique, and each competing for dominance 
by criticising, mis-describing, undermining or disregarding the other 
discourses. Foucault’s ideas about the nature of discourse, knowledge and 
power revealed themselves to be enormously useful. His efforts in 
analysing discourses in the fields of medicine, psychology, criminology, 
sexuality and ethics lead to a series of insights about the ways in which 
knowledge and discourse are shaped by power, insights that have proved 
useful for many scholars in many disciplines, including sociology, history, 
psychology, philosophy, politics, linguistics, cultural studies, and literary 
theory.1  
For me personally, these insights not only proved to be useful in my 
doctoral thesis and subsequent academic work, they have also influenced 
the way I perceive and interpret claims made and arguments presented in 
politics and current affairs and even during communications and 
interactions in my professional life and my personal life. Foucault insisted 
that most claims that are presented as ‘truth’ can be viewed as expressions 
of power by the maker of the claim, seeking to shape the knowledge and 
understanding of those to whom the claim is made and to subvert or 
undermine competing claims. This was not presented as a ‘bad’ thing or as 
something that should be — or even can be — avoided. Rather, it was 
presented as a way of looking at competing truth claims that offers useful 
insights into the dispute, insights that may not be as apparent if one instead 
strives to simply identify which truth claim is ‘really true’ and to reject all 
the others. By viewing competing truth claims as vectors of power that are 
intersecting and interacting, and analysing those intersections and 
interactions, we can achieve an understanding that is, in my view, more 
informative and more aligned with reality than the more simplistic, binary 
approach where we seek to separate true from false and right from wrong. 
Consider, for example, the contemporary political landscape, 
characterised as it is by the divide between those within the community 
who identify as progressive and those who identify as conservative. Each 
side presents its perspective as truth; each side characterises the claims and 
arguments of the other side as misguided, ignorant or ‘fake news’; and each 
side deploys strategies intended to persuade those on the other side to 
change sides, to wake up or to at least acknowledge their ignorance. These 
strategies include rational argument and heartfelt rhetoric, but they also 
include bullying, abuse, and the use of cruel taunts and name-calling 
(including ‘redneck’, ‘bigot’, ‘basement dweller’, ‘fascist’, ‘racist’ and 
‘misogynist’ from one side; ‘leftist’, ‘libtard’, ‘feminist’, ‘SJW’, 
‘snowflake’ and ‘triggered’ from the other). There is a powerful temptation 
to choose a side in these culture wars, but it can be useful and informative 
to step back and see the field of discourse as a whole, to look at the debates 
and arguments as vectors of power, to consider the strategies and 
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 technologies of power deployed by both sides, and to see the ways in which 
each exercise of power by one side provokes resistance and a backlash from 
the other. Such an approach makes it possible to identify the weaknesses 
and flaws in one’s preferred discourse, and the strengths and insights from 
the other. The ultimate goal is not to resolve all differences and persuade 
everyone to see things the same way. Rather, the objective in adopting a 
Foucauldian approach is to see the state of affairs, and its historical 
emergence, more clearly, and describe it more accurately. 
I applied the Foucauldian approach to Australian legal education in my 
thesis, and I have just described how it can be applied to contemporary 
debates in politics. It can be applied to conflicts and debates within any 
discipline, to any political conflict, to controversies in any field or industry, 
and to arguments in committee meetings, staff meetings, and lunchrooms 
anywhere within the academy. It can certainly be applied during 
conversations about the law and politics of control and power, and it has 
the potential to reveal unexpected insights about legal and political 
problems. 
If you have the time and the patience, I recommend engaging with 
Foucault directly and reading his scholarship in his own words. However, 
Foucault’s writings have been described as difficult, complicated and 
inaccessible to the casual reader,2 and you may find it helpful to read about 
Foucault as a supplement to reading Foucault. In this paper, I offer my own 
interpretation of the Foucauldian approach in the form of ten insights about 
law and power. They are, of course, an interpretation and a simplification 
of some very complex, nuanced and challenging ideas expressed by 
Foucault, and that process of interpretation and simplification necessarily 
involves a distortion of the original ideas. This is not necessarily a bad thing, 
and Foucault himself encouraged others to take his ideas and apply them 
in new ways and in new contexts: 
What I say ought to be taken as ‘propositions’, ‘game openings’ where those 
who may be interested are invited to join in — they are not meant as dogmatic 
assertions to be taken or left en bloc.3 
It does mean that scholars better acquainted with Foucault’s work will 
almost certainly find fault with my interpretations. Even the reader 
unfamiliar with Foucault will find some of these insights to be flawed, or 
obvious. Personally, I have found these insights to have extraordinary 
explanatory power over the years, and I hope you find at least some of them 
useful. In presenting the ten insights, I contrast each with a more common 
sense or naïve understanding of law and power, one which aligns with my 
own understanding prior to encountering Foucault. I acknowledge that the 
naiveté may have been solely my own.  
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 II  Ten Insights 
The notion of power presented here is a common sense one in that it is 
defined simply as the capacity to exert influence over the thoughts, actions 
or wellbeing of others. Compelling someone to do something against their 
will, restraining someone’s movement, persuading someone to change 
their mind, or causing someone physical, psychological or emotional harm 
are all expressions of power. However, helping someone to do something 
they could not otherwise do, freeing someone from restraint, teaching them 
something new or giving someone physical, psychological or emotional 
pleasure are also expressions of power. If I say or do something that shapes 
or influences your experienced reality, I am exercising power over you. 
This, then, is the first insight from Foucault: power is not a bad thing. 
We often talk about power in negative terms, as if it necessarily involves 
repression or someone being forced to think or do something they would 
not otherwise choose to think or do. But power can also be exercised in a 
way that facilitates desired outcomes, or motivates or inspires others. 
Power can be productive. In Truth and Power, Foucault wrote: 
But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for 
capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the 
effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such 
power; one identifies power with a law which says no — power is taken, above 
all, as carrying the force of a prohibition. Now I believe that this is a wholly 
negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, one which has been curiously 
widespread. If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that 
it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression.4 
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault wrote:  
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it 
‘conceals’. In fact power produces: it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be 
gained of him belong to this production.5  
Power is not, per se, something that needs to be criticised or avoided 
whenever it arises. The ways in which power is exercised may be deserving 
of criticism, but power itself is neither good nor evil. It simply is. Foucault 
insisted that instead of judging power, we should investigate what forms of 
power are at work in those situations we seek to understand. 
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 Foucault also tells us that power cannot be abolished. We may believe 
that to be genuinely free we must remove ourselves from the influence of 
power, but there is no place where power is absent and freedom prevails. 
Power is always present in one form or another. If freedom does exist, it is 
the capacity to choose the forms that power takes. Foucault might even go 
further and say that ‘freedom’ as a concept is itself a technology of power. 
It is no more than one of strategies deployed within liberal discourse to 
encourage adherence to liberal principles, an illusory possibility that can 
never be realised because the notion of a subject that can be free is itself 
illusory (see below). We are always subject to power – and we are always 
exercising power. 
This leads to the third insight: power is not monopolised by the 
powerful. Prior to encountering Foucault, I thought of power as something 
possessed by the few and exercised to the disadvantage of the many. The 
state had power: the executive government, the legislature, and the 
judiciary. The wealthy had power: rich businesspersons and large 
corporations. The rest of us were powerless, subject to the directives and 
whims of the powerful unless we took action to free ourselves. Foucault 
showed, however, that while the powerful do indeed wield power, power is 
wielded by everyone. He rejected the ‘zero sum’ view of power. Power is 
not something which is held and used by some, and lacked by others. Men 
exercise power over women, the strong exercise power over the weak, the 
rich exercise power over the poor, members of the dominant culture 
exercise power over minorities, and the able exercise power over the 
differently abled — but women also exercise power over men, the weak 
exercise power over the strong, the poor exercise power over the rich, 
minorities exercise power over members of the dominant culture, and the 
differently abled exercise power over the able. There are no powerless; 
there are only different types of power.  
This is not to say that power is always exercised fairly or that injustice 
does not exist. Power can be, and often is, exercised oppressively. Foucault 
stressed that the play of power does produce systematic power relations, 
and that there are rulers and ruled, dominators and dominated. However, to 
focus only upon the exercise of power by the obviously powerful over the 
less obviously powerful is to oversimplify a state of affairs that is better 
seen as a complex and dynamic interplay of competing and overlapping 
vectors of power. 
The fourth insight is that power is everywhere. We do not only 
encounter power when we engage with the government, the legal system, 
our employers or the wealthy and influential. Power is present in all forms 
of social relations, it is ‘at work’ in every situation. We encounter and 
engage with power every minute of every day, whenever others exercise 
power over us, whenever we exercise power over others, and whenever we 
exercise power over ourselves.  
To distinguish these localised types of power from the power exercised 
by the state, Foucault referred to the ‘micro-physics’ of power, or ‘micro-
power’. He insisted that micro-power, in particular power located in sites 
 away from the central locations of macro-power, had become a defining 
characteristic of power.6 And any analysis of power ‘should not concern 
itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central 
locations’, but ‘with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, 
with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional 
and local forms and institutions’.7 If, for example, we want to analyse the 
power of the major banks in Australia, we should not limit our analysis to 
the way banks relate to, and are regulated by, the state: the legislation that 
applies to banking, the profits that they make, and the taxes that they pay. 
We should also consider the way banks and banking impact the lived 
experiences of individuals on a daily basis: the way individual clients use 
particular banking apps, pay various types of banking fees, transfer funds 
to each other, visit specific local branches, use specific ATMs, and so on. 
To ignore the operation of micro-power is to conduct an incomplete 
analysis. 
Micro-powers do not, however, exist in a vacuum; they interrelate, they 
compete, and they sometimes align. In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault 
suggested that some micro-powers may ‘form a general line of force that 
traverses the local oppositions and links them together … Major 
dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these 
confrontations.’8 This view uses the metaphor of a ‘vector’ of power, in 
which a number of different forces act in such a way to produce an 
aggregate force acting in a direction different from many of the originating 
forces. The attraction of this model is that the micro-powers remain 
autonomous and there is no implication of intentionality or purpose which 
underlies or explains the direction in which the resultant force operates. 
This model also avoids an overly simplistic, binary representation of power 
relations. As Foucault insisted: 
[O]ne should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a 
binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ on the other, 
but rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially 
susceptible of integration into overall strategies.9 
A focus upon the operation of micro-powers reminds us that power is 
always present. In fact, power is present now as you read this text; by 
presenting my ideas to you and arguing in their favour I am seeking to 
transform your beliefs about law and power — and this is an attempt by me 
to exert power over you. And to the extent that you question or disagree 
with any of these ideas, my exercise of power is provoking resistance in 
you, and this is an exercise of power by you. 
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 The fifth insight is that power always provokes resistance. Whenever 
power is exercised, resistance will arise. Foucault wrote: 
[T]here are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are the more 
real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of 
power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere 
to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power. 
It exists all the more by being in the same place as power.10 
Resistance is not external to power. It is an inevitable, ever present 
aspect of the exercise of power: 
Where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power … These 
points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there 
is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or 
pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of 
them a special case; resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others 
that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent; still others 
that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition they can 
only exist in the strategic field of power relations.11 
The more forceful the exercise of power, the greater the resistance. The 
resistance may be as modest as a negative thought or a critical comment, it 
may take the form of a refusal to cooperate, and in extreme cases it may 
take the form of political action, insurrection and revolt. Whether it is a 
state imposing an unwelcome or unjust law upon a community, or a law 
teacher striving to exert discipline over an unruly class, the exercise of 
power will be resisted. This is not necessarily because the exercise of 
power is inappropriate (although it may be). Rather, the resistance is an 
inevitable consequence of the exercise of power. Physics provides a helpful 
analogy: movement in one direction almost always encounters some form 
of friction, and that friction is resistance. Friction is of course absent in a 
vacuum — but power is never exercised in a vacuum because it is always 
exercised in relation to something or someone else.  
Foucault did not suggest that a discursive field consists of a simple 
competition between a dominant discourse and a resistant discourse:  
[W]e must not imagine a world of discourse divided between the accepted 
discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the 
dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into 
play in various strategies.12 
It would be overly simplistic to portray any complex situation as 
consisting of a binary tension between conservative and progressive, 
between orthodox and radical, or between hegemonic and marginalised 
discourses. Rather, there is a dynamic and unstable confusion of contesting 
and cooperating discourses and resistances. This of course makes a 
                                                          
10 Ibid 142. 
11 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, above n 6, 96. 
12 Ibid 100. 
 Foucauldian analysis much more complicated, but it is also much more 
realistic. 
The sixth insight is that power shapes knowledge. Foucault is perhaps 
best known for his investigations into the intimate relationship between 
power and knowledge, and coined the term ‘power-knowledge’ to indicate 
this relationship. (He did not, however, insist that power and knowledge 
are the same thing.) The production and dissemination of knowledge is an 
expression of power, and the expression of power always involves the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. The accumulation of 
knowledge, whether as individuals or as a community, is not the outcome 
of an apolitical quest for absolute, universal truth. Rather, what we know, 
individually and collectively, is the outcome of conflicts and contests 
between competing discourses and competing explanations, outcomes that 
are determined not by consistency with reality but in favour of those 
capable of exercising power most effectively. What a law student knows 
about contract law is determined in large part by what they are taught in 
the contract law classroom, and this is determined not by consistency with 
universally accepted principles of contract law but by the outcome of 
generations of debates involving academics, lawyers and judges about the 
content and nature of contract law. What we know about our fundamental 
human rights is not based on universally accepted principles but upon the 
outcome of complex and lengthy political processes and academic debates 
about the content and extent of those rights, and those processes and 
debates involve numerous competing discourses, claim, arguments and 
positions. Discourses, according to Foucault, “must be treated as 
discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed 
with one another, but can just as well exclude or be aware of each other”.13 
Every discourse, ideology and perspective is in perpetual competition with 
alternative worldviews. The knowledge that ends up being accepted as 
truth is determined by power. 
This is the seventh insight: power determines truth. ‘Truth’ is no more 
than a status that various knowledges claim. According to Foucault, truth 
and knowledge are not to be accepted as universal but instead investigated 
and understood in terms of the conditions of their production and 
dissemination. Foucault appears to have believed that there are no universal 
or self-evident truths. Rather, all truths are contingent, conditional and, 
often, arbitrary. Something is accepted as truth because someone powerful 
insisted that it was true and others accepted it. This is an insight that is 
obvious to many, and it is one that is easy to apply to ‘truths’ that we do 
not personally accept. It is much more challenging to apply it to the truths 
that we do accept, and it is both insightful and disorienting to take the time 
to reflect upon our most closely held truths and try to see the ways in which 
they have been established by those with power for their own benefit. 
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 The eighth insight is that law is a strategy of power. It is usually a 
particularly forceful strategy of power. Law is a strategy of power used by 
the state and by those with influence over the state’s lawmaking processes 
to influence the thoughts, actions and wellbeing of others by stating that 
certain behaviours are acceptable and other behaviours will be punished, 
or lead to undesirable consequences. Law is a mechanism deployed by the 
state to compel members of the community to refrain from causing certain 
types of harm, to keep promises, to be careful, and so on. In this conception 
of the nature of law, the content of the positive law is determined not by 
alignment with natural law, justice, moral principles, human rights or 
divine principles, but as the outcome of the contests of power that take 
place in the political and legislative spheres. Law is both the outcome of 
conflicts of power and a tool used by some to exercise power over others.  
Law was not actually one of Foucault’s explicit objects of investigation. 
He preferred to explore the nature of non-legal power. Nevertheless, law 
did feature in many of his texts. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, he wrote: 
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives 
at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; 
humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds 
from domination to domination.14 
In The Will to Knowledge, Foucalt acknowledged the historical 
importance of law as a technology of power: 
Law was not simply a weapon skilfully wielded by monarchs: it was the 
monarchic system’s mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability. In 
Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been 
formulated in terms of law.15 
Foucault also offered a further important insight (the ninth) about the 
relationship between law and power: law is only one of the many strategies 
of power, and it is far from the most influential.  
Law is neither the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power which 
is at once complex and partial. The form of law with its effects of prohibition 
needs to be resituated among a number of other-non-juridical mechanisms.16 
As explained earlier, Foucault challenged our tendency to equate 
‘power’ with repression exercised by some centralised agency. He insisted 
that a focus upon sovereignty and centralised law obscures the operation of 
more subtle mechanisms of power.17 He concluded that any analysis of 
power should be directed not towards juridical sovereignty and the state, 
but towards the operations of power in dispersed and localised sites (a point 
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 made earlier in relation to micro-power). In The Will to Knowledge, 
Foucalt wrote: 
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that institutions of 
justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a 
norm, and the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum 
of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the 
most part regulatory.18  
In Truth and Power, he wrote:  
To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms 
of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of law. If one describes all 
these phenomena of power as dependent on the state apparatus, this means 
grasping them as essentially repressive: the army as a power of death, police 
and justice as punitive instances, etc. I don’t want to say that the state isn’t 
important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis 
that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. In 
two senses: first of all, because the state, for all the omnipotence of its 
apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power 
relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of other, 
already existing power relations.19 
The long term behaviour of others, in large numbers, are shaped not by 
legal rules but by the subtler strategies deployed by educational institutions, 
religious institutions, advertising, the media, advertising, customs and 
tradition. This is an insight of direct relevance to legal scholars: in 
analysing the impact of the law upon human behaviours, one cannot 
disregard the many other strategies of power at play, and which form law’s 
context. 
The tenth and final insight is one that I personally have struggled to 
fully appreciate and apply consistently. Foucault argued that power and 
discourse are non-subjective. By this he meant that power is not exercised 
by subjects, and discourse is not created by subjects. Rather, power in the 
form of discourse, creates subjects:  
If there is one approach that I do reject [it is the one] which gives absolute 
priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, 
which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity — which, in 
short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that the historical 
analysis of … discourse, in the last resort, be subject, not to a theory of the 
knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice.20 
Psychiatric discourses produce both the sane and the mentally ill person. 
Penological discourses produce both the law-abiding citizen and the 
criminal. Neoliberalism is not the creation of wealthy capitalists; rather, 
wealthy capitalists, as subjects, are created by neoliberalism. Marxists are 
created by Marxism, and feminists are created by feminism. Within the 
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19 Truth and Power, above n 4, 63–64. 
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 context of law, legal positivism is not the creation of legal positivists; rather, 
legal positivists are the creation of legal positivism. The discourse pre-
exists the subjectivity. When seeking to identify the ‘cause’ of a particular 
strategy of power, it would be erroneous to locate the cause in the exercise 
by a powerful subject of their free will. Rather, we should identify the 
historical and contextual contingencies that facilitate the relevant discourse 
and are consistent with its successful propagation.  
For example, if we are critically analysing Australia’s current 
immigration policy and the reasons why certain refugees and asylum 
seekers are being held in detention centres, we should not attribute this state 
of affairs to the wilful choices of certain individual politicians and law 
makers. Rather, we should recognise that the detention of these people is 
appropriate and correct within the context of certain discourses; we should 
identify those discourses; and we should identify the historical and 
contextual contingencies that lead to those discourses being dominant over 
competing discourses within which detention is seen as inappropriate and 
incorrect. Our analysis then focuses upon the ways in which pro-detention 
and anti-detention discourses interact, and the ways in which the strategies 
of power deployed by these discourses are deployed more or less 
successfully.  
As with all of these insights, the Foucauldian approach to identifying 
the causes of a particular state of affairs, and the emphasis upon non-
subjective contingencies rather than individual choices and actions, can 
provide an understanding not otherwise achievable, and reveal courses of 
action not otherwise apparent. The challenge with this final insight is its 
application to our own subjectivity. I personally find it very difficult to 
attribute my beliefs and actions to the discourses by which I am dominated 
rather than to my own conscious choices and free will. But when I reflect 
upon this insight, I recognise that my ideas about, say, law or legal 
education are not my own, but come from elsewhere; that who I am as a 
subject is made up of numerous such externally originated ideas; and that 
with this insight, as with the others described above, Foucault, perhaps, got 
it right. 
III  Conclusion  
Foucault taught me that power is everywhere, and that it is not a bad thing. 
Power can never be abolished, and it is not monopolised by the powerful. 
Power always provokes resistance, which in turn provokes a different 
expression of power. Knowledge and truth are intimately connected with 
power. Law is a strategy of power, and it is not the most important strategy 
of power. And power creates subjects, rather than being something that 
subjects seize and wield.  
For me, these insights were and are transformative. They continue to 
inform my understanding of the nature of law and its manner of function. 
They inform my perception of political events, and they often inform the 
way I view communications and other interactions between individuals, 
 including my own interactions, enabling me — when appropriate — to see 
disagreements and conflicts not as ‘true’ versus ‘false’ or ‘right’ versus 
‘wrong’, but as evidence of the natural and unavoidable tension between 
different discourses and as part of the larger map of competing vectors of 
power that exist at every level of society. There is a kind of empathy and 
compassion that emerges when we can loosen our grasp upon our own 
preferred discourse, see competing discourses not as ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ but 
as simply ‘other’, see our disagreements and conflicts as an inevitable 
characteristic of human life, and recognise and accept power not as 
something to be distrusted and opposed but as a natural mechanism by 
which discourses jostle for dominance.  
I sincerely hope that Foucault’s ideas, and my own simplified and 
contextualised versions of them, prove useful during the conversations to 
take place about the law and politics of control and power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
